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U.S. NINTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
Romberg v. Nichols, et al.,
48 F.3d 453, 95 D.A.R. 2465,
No. 93-56296 (Feb. 24, 1995).
PlaintiffsAwarded $1 Each in
Civil Rights Case Are Not Entitled
to Attorneys' Fees
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a court must award attorneys' fees to a
plaintiff in a civil rights case who received
a verdict in the amount of $1. Plaintiffs
Michael and Debra Romberg filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against several Los Angeles Sheriff's deputies and
against the County of Los Angeles itself;
among other things, the Rombergs alleged
that the deputies violated their constitutional rights by not obtaining a search
warrant before entering their home in response to a call about a domestic disturbance in 1982. After trial, a jury found in
favor of the Rombergs, but awarded only
$1 to each of them. Asserting their status
as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. section 1988, the Rombergs sought an award
of attorneys' fees in the amount of $45,000.
The U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California eventually issued an
attorneys' fee award of $29,137.50; the
defendants appealed.
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent holding in Farrarv. Hobby, 113
S.Ct. 566 (1992), the Ninth Circuit initially noted that the Rombergs are indeed
"prevailing parties" in the suit, stating that
even a plaintiff who wins only nominal
damages is a prevailing party under section 1988; however, the court noted that
status as a prevailing party does not necessarily entitle the Rombergs to attorneys'
fees. Citing Farrar,the Ninth Circuit noted
that the most critical factor in determining
the reasonableness of a fee award is the
degree of success obtained. Based on Farrar,the Ninth Circuit held that the Rombergs are a "perfect example" of plaintiffs
who should receive no attorneys' fees at
all; according to the court, the Rombergs
may have prevailed, but they did not succeed.
The Rombergs attempted to distinguish
their case from Farrarby claiming that,
although they initially sought $2 million
in punitive and compensatory damages
against each of eight Sheriff's deputies,
their attorneys' closing argument suggested
that an award in the amount of "one dollar" might be appropriate. The court acknowledged that the Rombergs' attorney

did in fact make such a statement to the
jury, but found that "such a strategy cannot
trump Farrar... [a]n attorney cannot avoid
Farrar'smandate by waiting until the close
of trial and then, when he perceives that
his clients have little chance of success,
asking for only nominal damages to justify an attorneys' fee award."
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that
the Rombergs failed to identify any nonmonetary successes resulting from their
litigation efforts. The court noted that it
would recognize that if a lawsuit 'achieves
other tangible results-such as sparking a
change in policy or establishing a finding
of fact with potential collateral estoppel
effects-such results will, in combination
with an enforceable judgment for a nominal sum, support an award of fees."' However, the court found such tangible results
to be "utterly lacking in the records of this
case."
CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT

Powers, et al., v. City of
Richmond,
10 Cal. 4th 85, 95 D.A.R. 5885,
No. S039547 (May 8, 1995).
Statute Making ExtraordinaryWrit
Exclusive Mode of Appellate
Review Does Not Violate State
Constitution'sAppellate
JurisdictionProvision
Actions seeking disclosure of documents under the Public Records Act (PRA)
(Government Code section 6250 et seq.)
may be brought and tried in superior court,
and thus are within that court's original
jurisdiction; pursuant to Government Code
section 6259(c), superior court decisions
in PRA cases are not appealable but instead are "immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of an extraordinary writ." In this
proceeding, the California Supreme Court
considered whether section 6259(c) violates the state Constitution and, in particular, section 11 of article VI, which states
that, except when a judgment of death has
been pronounced, the "courts of appeal
have appellate jurisdiction when superior
courts have original jurisdiction...."
Plaintiffs commenced an action in superior court under the PRA to compel the
City of Richmond to prepare and release a
computer-generated report containing
specific information; after hearing evidence, the superior court ruled for the City.
Plaintiffs then sought review in the Court
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of Appeal both by a petition for writ of
mandate and by direct appeal.
After soliciting and considering informal opposition concerning the merits of
plaintiffs' PRA request, the First District
Court of Appeal denied plaintiffs' writ
petition summarily. The City then moved
to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal as barred under
section 6259(c); the First District issued an
opinion granting the motion. In so doing, the
First District interpreted the "appellatejurisdiction" provision of the state Constitution
as granting the courts of appeal power to
review final judgments and orders in all
proceedings (except death penalty cases) in
which superior courts exercise originaljurisdiction, but also as not requiring any
particular form or mode of this appellate
review. Concluding that extraordinary writ
petitions and direct appeals are alternative
modes of appellate review, the First District held that the "appellate jurisdiction"
provision of the state Constitution does
not deprive the legislature of authority to
specify that appellate review of superior
court orders in PRA cases shall be by
means of petition for extraordinary writ
rather than by direct appeal.
On appeal, the California Supreme
Court affirmed. Among other things, the
court found that the legislature's purpose
in replacing review by direct appeal with
review by extraordinary writ was not to
disadvantage litigants seeking review of
PRA decisions or to constrict the power of
the courts of appeal to correct errors in
those decisions; rather, the court found
that "the legislative objective was to expedite the process and thereby to make the
appellate remedy more effective."
However, the plaintiffs contended that
appellate review by extraordinary writ petition is inherently less effective than a
remedy by direct appeal because issuance
of the extraordinary writs is discretionary
whereas direct appeal guarantees a decision on the merits. According to the court,
this argument "betrays a serious misunderstanding of the discretionary character
of extraordinary writs." The court explained
that although appellate review by extraordinary writ petition is said to be discretionary, a court must exercise its discretion
"within reasonable bounds and for a proper
reason." According to the court, "when
writ review is the exclusive means of appellate review of a final order to judgment,
an appellate court may not deny an apparently meritorious writ petition, timely presented in a formally and procedurally sufficient manner, merely because, for example, the petition presents no important issue
of law or because the court considers the
case less worthy of its attention than other
matters."
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Board of Supervisors of the
County of Los Angeles, et al., v.

American Lung
Association v. Wilson
and
Americans for Nonsmokers'
Rights v. State of California,

Superior Court, et al.,
32 Cal. App. 4th 1616,95 D.A.R.
3066, No. B085744 (Mar. 7, 1995).
Discovery of Extrinsic Evidence on
Legislators' Thought ProcessIs An
Impermissible JudicialIntrusion
In 1993, the Los Angeles County
Board of Supervisors decided to consolidate court-related services in the County
sheriff instead of in the marshal's office.
Government Code section 26639 requires
the Board of Supervisors to "take into
advisement the recommendation of the
judges" as to their preferred agency; by a
vote of 298-63, the judges had voted in
favor of the marshal providing bailiff services to the courts. Following the supervisors' decision, plaintiffs-including the
Municipal Court Judges' Association, Los
Angeles County-sued the Board, and
subsequently sought discovery concerning whether the supervisors ignored, or
even considered, the vote of the Los Angeles municipal and superior court judges.
The Second District Court of Appeal
characterized the judges' discovery request as "an attempt to inquire into the
supervisors' mental processes in reaching
their decision to select the sheriff's office
instead of the marshal's office," and concluded that "[liegal precedent prohibits
such an inquiry into the supervisors' mental processes." Among other things, the
Second District stated that the "vague nature of legislators' thought processes and
motives corresponds to the lack of an objective standard by which a party might
establish, or a court might review, whether
Board members actually considered the
judges' recommendation. The statute sets
forth no criteria concerning the length of
time, degree of earnestness, or amount of
effort or energy necessary for Board members to comply with the statutory requirement that they take the judges' recommendation into advisement. Neither does this
court have any means to judge the competing considerations considered by the

Board, why those considerations prevailed over the judges' recommendation,
or whether that recommendation should
have prevailed."
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Nos. 379257 and 379450
(Mar. 30, 1995).
Judge Orders State to Stop
Siphoning Money from
Tobacco Tax
On March 30, Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Roger Warren issued a
decision holding that the state illegally
diverted millions of dollars from antismoking education and research programs
to pay for health care services. Warren
held that the diversion of the funds violated provisions of Proposition 99, passed
by the voters in 1988; Proposition 99 imposed a tax of $0.25 per pack on cigarettes
and required that about a nickel of it be
devoted to tobacco control programs. With
the approval of Governor Wilson, however, state legislators enacted AB 816
(Isenberg) (Chapter 195, Statutes of 1994),
which diverted $128 million from those
accounts to medical services. Warren noted
that Proposition 99 allows the legislature
to amend its provisions only by a fourfifths majority of each house and only in
a manner consistent with the measure's
purposes; although AB 816 received the
requisite four-fifths vote, Warren found
that the diversions were inconsistent with
the initiative's purposes.

of Proposition 187 until a trial determines
their constitutionality; Pfaelzer found that
most of the measure will probably be
found unconstitutional, and its enforcement would cause many people to suffer
irreparable harm because they would go
without medical care, be kicked out of
public school, or fail to report crimes and
abuse to police. [15:1 CRLR 183] State
attorneys responded by filing motions to
have Pfaelzer abstain from or dismiss the
federal court challenge to the measure; on
March 13, Pfaelzer denied those motions
without comment, and set a trial date of
September 5. However, state attorneys
have appealed Pfaelzer's issuance of the
preliminary injunction to the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals; at this writing,
the appellate court is expected to issue its
opinion on the appeal in July.
- State Court. In November 1994, San
Francisco Superior Court Judge Stuart
Pollak also blocked enforcement of certain aspects of Proposition 187; specifically, Judge Pollak issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of
the measure's requirement that undocumented immigrants be kicked out of the
state's public schools, as well as public
colleges and universities. [15:1 CRLR
183] On January 26, Judge Pollak tentatively scheduled the underlying trial on
the initiative's ban on public education for
illegal immigrants, for June. Further, on
February 8, Judge Pollak issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of
the measure's provisions regarding public
education.

PROPOSITION 187
LEGAL CHALLENGES
The day after California voters approved Proposition 187-the so-called
"Save Our State" anti-illegal immigration
initiative [14:4 CRLR 28-291-in the November 1994 election, attorneys filed
eight separate legal challenges to the measure in state and federal courts; the plaintiffs in those actions include the California
League of United Latin American Citizens, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Center
for Human Rights and Constitutional Law.
[15:1 CRLR 183] The following is a status
update on the challenges to the initiative:
- Federal Court. On January 18, U.S.
District Court Judge Mariana Pfaelzer issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the challenged provisions
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